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The	Proportionality	of	Common	Sense	Causal	Claims	Jennifer	McDonald	
	This	paper	defends	strong	proportionality	against	what	I	take	to	be	its	principal	objection	–	that	proportionality	fails	to	preserve	common	sense	causal	intuitions	–	by	articulating	independently	plausible	constraints	on	representing	causal	situations.	I	first	assume	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality,	following	Woodward.1	This	views	proportionality	as	a	relational	constraint	on	variable	selection	in	causal	modeling	that	requires	that	changes	in	the	cause	variable	line	up	with	those	in	the	effect	variable.	I	then	argue	that	the	principal	objection	derives	from	a	failure	to	recognize	two	constraints	on	variable	selection	presupposed	by	interventionism:	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity.		
	 	
																																																								1	Woodward	2003		
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1.	Introduction	
	Yablo’s	principle	of	proportionality	holds,	roughly,	that	something	counts	as	a	cause	of	some	effect	just	in	case	it	includes	the	appropriate	degree	of	causal	information.2	Proportionality	has	been	put	to	various	philosophical	uses,	such	as	a	proposed	solution	for	the	causal	exclusion	argument,	and	as	a	justification	and	explanation	of	the	dependence	on	high-level	causal	explanations	in	the	special	sciences.	However,	the	precise	formulation	of	such	a	principle	has	proven	to	be	controversial.			I	take	the	most	promising	formulation	to	be	an	interventionist	one,	following	Woodward.3	Such	a	formulation	defines	proportionality	as	a	relational	constraint	on	variable	selection	in	causal	modeling.	In	this	paper,	I	argue	that	this	formulation	works	well	as	it	is	–	contra	Franklin-Hall	(see	2016)	–	so	long	as	we	recognize	two	independently	plausible	background	requirements	on	variable	selection.	I	call	these	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity.	Exhaustivity	holds	that	a	variable	must	take	at	least	one	of	its	values.	Exclusivity	holds	that	a	variable	can	take	at	most	one	of	its	values.	Both	constraints	are	relative	to,	and	thereby	help	to	make	explicit,	the	modal	assumptions	implicit	in	causal	inquiry.			Finally,	with	these	requirements	in	place,	I	defend	proportionality	against	its	principal	objection:	that	it	fails	to	preserve	fundamental	causal	intuitions.	I	demonstrate	how	this	concern	derives	from	a	failure	to	recognize	and	integrate	the	modal	assumptions	implicit	in	causal	inquiry,	in	tandem	with	an	inappropriate	use	of	variables	to	represent	causal	situations.		
	
2.	Interventionism	
	The	formulation	of	proportionality	that	I	endorse	comes	directly	from	Woodward,	and	is	defined	in	terms	of	his	interventionist	account	of	causation.	Interventionism	expands	on	the	intuition	that	causal	claims	provide																																																									2	Yablo	1992	3	Woodward	2003,	2008a,	2008b,	2010,	2016	
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manipulability	information.	If	X	causes	Y,	then	manipulating	or	changing	X	is	a	way	of	manipulating	Y.	It	then	exploits	the	language	of	causal	models	to	identify	and	articulate	different	causal	relations	of	interest.	A	causal	model	can	take	a	variety	of	forms,	such	as	graphical,	potential-outcome,	and	structural-equations	models.4	However,	I’ll	restrict	discussion	of	causal	models	in	this	paper	to	graphical	models.	A	graphical	model	is,	essentially,	a	set	of	variables	–	representing	the	causal	relata	–	and	a	directed	binary	relation	between	them	–	representing	causal	influence.		Interventionism	then	defines	the	notion	of	an	intervention	on	a	system.	An	intervention,	I,	first	must	directly	change	the	value	of	some	variable,	X,	in	such	a	way	that	it	breaks	the	dependence	that	X	may	have	had	on	other	variables	in	the	system.	Second,	I	must	be	designed	in	such	a	way	that	any	change	in	the	effect	variable,	Y,	will	be	the	direct	result	of	X	and	not	of	I	itself.	Finally,	I	must	be	wholly	independent	of	other	possible	causes	of	Y,	whether	such	causes	are	represented	by	the	given	model	or	not.	A	more	precise	formulation	than	this	won’t	matter	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper.5			With	this	in	place,	the	interventionist	then	defines	a	basic	notion	of	cause,	which	corresponds	most	closely	with	the	intuitive	notion	of	causal	relevance:			 (Principle	M)	X	causes	Y	iff	there	are	background	circumstances	B	such	that	if	some	(single)	intervention	that	changes	the	value	of	X	(and	no	other	variable)	were	to	occur	in	B,	then	Y	would	change.	(Woodward	2003,	222)		That	is,	in	order	for	X	to	be	a	cause	of	Y,	the	change	in	X	from	one	value	to	another	as	the	result	of	an	intervention	corresponds	to	the	change	in	Y	from	one	value	to	another,	given	some	fixed	set	of	background	parameters.	Various	kinds	of	causal	relations	are	then	captured	by	refinements	on	this	basic	notion.	Due	to																																																									4	See	Greenland	and	Brumback	2002	and	Hitchcock	2009	for	overviews	of	causal	models.	5	See	Woodward	2003,	chapter	3,	especially	98	
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the	irrelevance	of	these	and	further	details	to	my	argument,	I’ll	leave	my	overview	of	interventionism	here.6		
3.	Proportionality	as	Relational	Constraint	on	Variable	Selection		Interventionism	places	variables	front	and	center	in	how	we	represent	and	inquire	into	causation.	Thus,	more	needs	to	be	said	about	the	criteria	for	variable	selection.	Although	the	variables	can	be	taken	to	represent	different	things,	I	will	assume	throughout	that	the	set	of	values	of	a	particular	variable	represents	a	set	of	properties	–	constrained	by	a	given	property	type	–	that	are	possibly	instantiated	by	some	particular	thing.	The	assumed	causal	relata	of	this	paper	will	therefore	be	property	instantiations.		This	paper	addresses	two	questions	relevant	to	variable	selection:	(i)	What	determines	the	range	of	values	that	a	variable	can	take?	(ii)	At	what	level	of	description	should	the	values	of	the	variables	be?	Proportionality	has	been	proposed	as	an	answer	to	(ii).	However,	after	laying	out	the	proposal,	I’ll	go	on	to	argue	that	while	(ii)	can	be	answered	by	the	principle	of	proportionality,	it	can	only	do	so	alongside	an	appropriate	answer	to	(i).	One	aspect	of	such	an	answer	is	that	the	background	modal	context	determines	the	range	of	values	that	a	variable	takes.	
	Constraints	on	variable	selection	can	be	divided	into	two	kinds:	relational	constraints	and	non-relational	constraints.	Relational	constraints	pertain	to	the	extrinsic	nature	of	the	variables	in	a	causal	model,	to	how	“variables	relate	to	one	another.”	(Woodward	2016,	1056)	One	example	of	such	a	constraint	is	stability.7	
Stability	is	the	persistence	of	the	causal	relation	between	a	cause	variable	and	an	effect	variable,	despite	changes	in	the	background	conditions.	The	more	changes	such	a	relation	can	survive,	the	more	stable	it	is.		
																																																								6	See	Woodward	2003,	chapter	2,	especially	section	3	7	See	Woodward	2010,	2016	
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Proportionality	is	just	such	a	relational	constraint.	It	holds	that	changes	in	a	cause	variable	should	line	up	with	changes	in	an	effect	variable.	Intuitively,			 Proportionality	has	to	do	with	whether	changes	in	the	state	of	the	cause	‘line	up’	in	the	right	way	with	changes	in	the	state	of	the	effect	and	with	whether	the	cause	and	effect	are	characterized	in	a	way	that	contains	irrelevant	detail.	(Woodward	2010,	287)		Take	Yablo’s	pigeon	example.8	Sophie	the	pigeon	is	trained	to	peck	at	red	things	and	only	at	red	things.	She	then	pecks	at	a	paint	chip,	which	is	a	particular	shade	of	red	–	scarlet.	Which	of	the	following	is	causally	relevant	to	Sophie’s	pecking:	the	chip’s	being	red	or	the	chip’s	being	scarlet?			When	translated	into	interventionist	terms,	this	becomes	a	false	dichotomy.	Take	the	variable,	P,	to	be	a	variable	representing	whether	the	pigeon	pecks	or	not.	It	can	take	the	values:	{peck,	not-peck}.	Now	consider	two	alternative	variables	for	representing	the	property-instantiations	of	the	paint	chip:	the	variable,	R,	which	can	take	the	values	{red,	not-red},	and	the	variable,	T,	which	can	take	the	values	{taupe,	scarlet,	cyan,	mauve,	crimson,	etc.},	where	‘etc.’	stands	for	all	other	physically	possible	colors	at	the	same	grain	as	those	already	made	explicit.	According	to	Principle	M,	the	causal	model	in	which	R	stands	as	causally	relevant	to	P	is	just	as	accurate	as	one	in	which	T	so	stands.	In	the	R	model,	R	is	causally	relevant	to	P	because	an	intervention	on	R	that	changes	its	value	from	not-red	to	
red	changes	P’s	value	from	not-peck	to	peck.	In	the	T	model,	T	is	causally	relevant	to	P	because	an	intervention	on	T	that	changes	its	value	from	taupe	to	scarlet	changes	P’s	value	from	not-peck	to	peck.		Interventionism	therefore	doesn’t	ask	the	question,	which	variable	stands	in	a	causal	relation	to	P?	For,	the	answer	is	‘both’.	R	and	T	are	each	causally	relevant	to	P.	But,	this	doesn’t	mean	that	their	respective	relationship	to	P	is	the	same.	R	is	proportional	to	P,	while	T	is	not.	All	of	the	changes	in	R	line	up	with	changes	in	
P	–	every	intervention	on	R	corresponds	to	a	change	in	P.	But	only	some	of	the																																																									8	Yablo	1992	
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changes	in	T	line	up	with	those	in	P	–	only	certain	interventions	on	T	correspond	to	changes	in	P.	The	intervention	that	changes	the	value	of	T	from	taupe	to	cyan,	for	example,	will	not	change	the	value	of	P.			Woodward	defines	proportionality	more	explicitly	as,		 (P)	There	is	a	pattern	of	systematic	counterfactual	dependence	(with	the	dependence	understood	along	interventionist	lines)	between	different	possible	states	of	the	cause	and	the	different	possible	states	of	the	effect,	where	this	pattern	of	dependence	at	least	approximates	to	the	following	ideal:	[it]	should	be	such	that	(a)	it	explicitly	or	implicitly	conveys	accurate	information	about	the	conditions	under	which	alternative	states	of	the	effect	will	be	realized	and	(b)	it	conveys	only	such	information	–	that	is,	the	cause	is	not	characterized	in	such	a	way	that	alternative	states	of	it	fail	to	be	associated	with	changes	in	the	effect.	(2010,	298)		There	are	two	views	on	what	this	difference	between	variables	like	R	and	T	means.	The	first	takes	proportional	variables	such	as	R	to	represent	genuine	causes,	while	non-proportional	variables	such	as	T	represent	merely	causally	relevant	factors.	Proportionality	is	thereby	considered	a	necessary	constraint	on	causation.	Call	this	strong	proportionality.9	The	second	view	takes	proportionality	to	be	a	merely	pragmatic	constraint	on	causal	explanation.10	Call	this	weak	proportionality.	Throughout	this	paper,	I	assume	and	defend	strong	proportionality.	
	
4.	Non-Relational	Constraints:	Exhaustivity	and	Exclusivity	
	
Non-relational	constraints,	on	the	other	hand,	pertain	to	the	intrinsic	nature	of	the	variables	in	a	causal	model.	These	constraints	“can	be	applied	to	variables,	individually,	independently	of	how	they	relate	to	other	variables.”	(Woodward																																																									9	See	List	and	Menzies	2009;	Menzies	and	List	2010;	and	Papineau	2013	10	See	Woodward	2015;	Shapiro	and	Sober	2012;	McDonnell	2017;	and	Weslake	2013,	2017	
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2016,	1057)	One	example	is	metaphysical	naturalness,	which	requires	that	variables	pick	out	only	natural	properties,	on	some	understanding	of	‘natural’.11	
	What	I	propose	to	call	the	exhaustivity	and	the	exclusivity	constraint	are	similarly	non-relational	constraints.	Take	exhaustivity	first.	The	exhaustivity	
constraint	requires	that	a	variable’s	values	capture	the	entire	range	of	relevant	possibilities	for	whatever	type	of	thing	the	variable	represents.	An	exhaustive	variable	is	one	that	must	take	one	of	its	values,	given	whatever	background	modal	constraints	are	in	place.	
	Since	I’ve	restricted	this	discussion	to	variables	whose	values	represent	the	property	instantiation	of	some	target	object,	I	can	define	exhaustivity	in	more	precise	terms.	Exhaustivity	is	the	constraint	on	a	variable	in	a	causal	model	that	holds	that	its	values	must	jointly	represent	the	range	of	possibilities	of	property	instantiation	by	the	given	object	for	the	given	property-type.	If	the	property-type	is	a	color,	for	example,	then	the	values	must	somehow	exhaust	the	color	spectrum.	This	can	be	done	quite	simply	with	a	binary	variable	that	can	take	the	values:	{some	particular	color,	not-(that	particular	color)}.			Next,	the	exclusivity	constraint	holds	that	the	values	of	a	given	variable	should	be	such	that	any	one	excludes	all	the	others.	Woodward	references	exclusivity	when	he	writes,			 When	considering	the	values	of	a	single	variable,	we	want	those	values	to	be	logically	exclusive,	in	the	sense	that	variable	X’s	taking	value	v	excludes	X’s	also	taking	value	v’,	where	v	≠	v’.	(2016,	1064)		In	other	words,	if	two	things	are	not	exclusive	–	if	they	could	occur	together	–	then	they	should	be	represented	by	distinct	variables.	While	exhaustivity	holds	that	a	variable	should	take	at	least	one	of	its	values,	exclusivity	holds	that	a	variable	should	take	at	most	one	of	its	values.																																																											11	See	Lewis	1983;	Menzies	1996;	Paul	2000;	and	Franklin-Hall	2016	
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Importantly,	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	are	each	relative	to	a	background	modal	context.	In	possible	worlds	terminology,	the	modal	context	is	the	set	of	possible	worlds	relevant	to	the	truth	of	the	counterfactual	that	captures	the	causal	claim.	It	can	be	described	as	a	set	of	worlds,	or	perhaps	more	succinctly	as	a	list	of	background	assumptions	that	define	such	a	set.	These	assumptions	can	include	any	constraint	that	operates	in	a	law-like	fashion.		For	example,	the	causal	claim,	“The	chip’s	being	scarlet	caused	the	pigeon	to	peck,”	corresponds	to	the	counterfactual,	“Had	the	chip	not	been	scarlet,	the	pigeon	wouldn’t	have	pecked.”	The	modal	context	of	this	claim	and	corresponding	counterfactual	is	the	set	of	possible	worlds	that	determines	whether	the	counterfactual	is	true.	So,	if	this	claim	and	counterfactual	are	meant	to	represent	a	specific	causal	situation	near	a	local	paint	chip	factory	that	specializes	in	just	the	colors	scarlet	and	cyan,	and	no	others,	then	the	relevant	set	of	possible	worlds	will	be	constrained	to	those	in	which	the	paint	chip	takes	one	of	the	two	factory	colors	–	cyan	or	scarlet.	In	this	context,	the	variable,	C,	that	can	take	the	values	{cyan,	scarlet},	is	an	exhaustive	variable.	Further,	given	this	set	of	worlds,	the	counterfactual	is	true.			If	instead	these	are	meant	to	represent	any	general	causal	situation	involving	paint	chips	and	a	red-pecking	pigeon,	then	the	relevant	set	of	possible	worlds	will	be	more	inclusive,	including	all	worlds	in	which	the	paint	chip	takes	any	color	within	the	color	spectrum.	C	is	not	exhaustive	relative	to	this	more	inclusive	modal	context.	But	the	variable	T,	from	before,	is.	Given	this	more	inclusive	set	of	worlds,	the	counterfactual	is	false,	since	the	pigeon	will	peck	in	response	to	shades	of	red	other	than	scarlet.		A	point	of	note	here	is	that	the	constraints	of	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	are	indeed	non-relational	constraints	in	the	sense	previously	defined.	Although	they	are	relative	to	the	modal	context,	they	are	not	relative	to	other	variables	in	the	model.	They	are	properties	of	a	variable	taken	independently	as	a	representation	of	the	target	scenario.			
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I	hold	that	causal	models	successfully	represent	causal	situations	in	part	by	requiring	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variables.	Proportionality,	defined	in	terms	of	causal	models,	also	requires	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variables.	A	significant	upshot	of	this	is	that	the	proportional	cause	is	not	only	relative	to	the	target	effect	variable,	but	also	to	the	background	modal	context.		
	
5.	Interventionist	Proportionality	Does	the	Trick	
	Franklin-Hall	contends	that	Woodward’s	formulation	of	proportionality	doesn’t	successfully	prioritize	intuitively	proportional	causal	relata,	such	as	red	in	the	pigeon	example.	However,	as	I’ll	argue,	presupposing	my	notion	of	exhaustivity	corrects	for	this	objection.		
	Franklin-Hall	argues	that	proportionality	as	laid	out	in	section	3	is	inadequate	for	capturing	the	kind	of	causal	explanation	we’re	looking	for.	To	do	so,	she	calls	upon	Sophie	and	her	paint	chip.	She	then	introduces	a	comparison	between	the	causal	variable,	R,	that	can	take	the	values:	{red,	not-red},	(as	above),	and	a	variable,	C,	that	can	instead	take	the	values:	{cyan,	scarlet}	(as	above).	R,	as	before,	is	proportional	to,	and	therefore	a	genuine	cause	of,	Y.	But,	she	argues,	C,	too,	is	proportional	to	Y,	since	every	possible	intervention	on	C	changes	the	value	of	Y.	An	intervention	on	C	that	changes	its	value	from	cyan	to	scarlet	changes	Y	from	not-peck	to	peck,	and	an	intervention	that	changes	C’s	value	from	scarlet	to	
cyan	changes	Y’s	value	from	peck	to	not-peck.	Thus,	the	changes	in	C	line	up	with	the	changes	in	Y	just	as	well	as	the	changes	in	R	do.	The	problem,	then,	is	that	proportionality,	as	formulated,	is	insufficient	to	its	intended	task.	It	fails	to	privilege	a	variable	like	R	over	one	like	C,	and	so	fails	to	prioritize	a	causal	model	that	uses	R	over	one	that	uses	C.		In	response	to	this	problem,	a	natural	move	would	be	to	find	a	way	to	disqualify	variables	like	C	from	the	arena.	Intuitively,	C	is	not	the	right	kind	of	variable.	But,	why	not?	I	propose	that	our	aversion	to	variables	like	C	is	due	to	their	failure	to	exhaustively	represent	the	implicit	modal	context	of	the	situation.	The	background	possibilities	relative	to	the	paint	chip	include	the	full	color	spectrum.	
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Unless	the	possible	color	of	the	paint	chip	is	restricted	in	some	way	–	by	the	local	factory,	for	example	–	then	the	target	object	can	fail	to	take	one	of	C’s	two	values.	There	are	other	physically	possible	colors	that	the	paint	chip	could	have	–	such	as	beige	or	olive	green	–	and	C’s	values	fail	to	represent	these	possibilities.			Relative	to	the	implicit	modal	context,	then,	C	is	not	an	exhaustive	variable.	The	variable,	R,	on	the	other	hand,	is	exhaustive,	since	the	object	must	take	one	of	R’s	two	values.	By	requiring	exhaustive	variables,	C	is	discounted	as	a	candidate	variable	relative	to	the	implicit	modal	context,	and	R	takes	privilege	as	the	proportional	cause.		In	general,	two	variables	are	in	proper	competition	with	each	other	over	which	is	proportional	to	some	effect	variable	only	when	they	are	exhaustive	relative	to	the	same	modal	context.	C	and	R	are	not	competitors	for	proportionality	relative	to	Y,	since	only	one	of	them	can	contain	an	exhaustive	set	of	active	possibilities	relative	to	any	given	modal	context.	
	
6.	Preserving	Causal	Intuitions	
	The	strongest	objection	to	proportionality,	as	raised	by	Bontly,	Shapiro	and	Sober,	McDonnell,	and	Weslake,	is	that	it	seems	to	render	many	common	sense	causal	claims	false.12	Call	this	the	objection	from	common	sense.	It	objects	to	strong	proportionality	by	attempting	to	demonstrate	that	if	proportionality	is	required	of	something	to	be	a	cause,	then	many	things	that	we	would	naturally	call	causes	don’t	actually	qualify.			Take	as	an	example	the	situation	where	Socrates	drinks	hemlock	and	then	dies,	and	the	corresponding	causal	claim,	‘Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	caused	him	to	die’.	The	objection	goes	that	drinking	hemlock	is	not	actually	proportional	to	Socrates	dying.	For	example,	if	Socrates	had	not	drank	hemlock,	but	still	consumed	it	–	by	eating	a	dozen	leaves,	for	example	–	then	he	still	would	have																																																									12	See	Bontly	2005;	Shapiro	and	Sober	2012;	McDonnell	2017;	and	Weslake	2013,	2017	
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died.	This	seems	to	show	that	the	changes	in	the	variable	that	represents	Socrates	drinking	hemlock	don’t	line	up	with	the	changes	in	the	variable	that	represents	Socrates	dying.	The	first	variable	could	change	values	from	Socrates-
drinks-hemlock	to	Socrates-eats-hemlock	and	the	second	variable	would	retain	the	value	Socrates-dies.	This	common	sense	causal	claim	is	therefore	not	proportional.	The	proportional	cause	should	be,	instead,	consuming	hemlock.		However,	this	objection	is	mistaken.	It	fails	to	respect	the	exhaustivity	constraint	on	variable	selection,	and	thereby	equivocates	between	different	background	modal	contexts.	It	further	fails	to	respect	exclusivity,	and	thereby	runs	together	what	should	be	different	variables.	Rectifying	this	illuminates	the	implicit	proportionality	of	common	sense	causal	claims.		First,	the	objection	ignores	the	fact	that	proportionality,	in	requiring	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variables,	is	relative	to	modal	context.	Take	the	hemlock	example	just	outlined.	Importantly,	this	example	and	corresponding	claim	are	under-defined.13	Translated	into	interventionist	terms,	all	that	this	description	provides	is	that	there	is	some	variable	that	takes	a	value	that	represents	Socrates	drinking	hemlock,	and	an	intervention	on	this	variable	changes	the	value	of	some	other	variable	to	one	that	represents	Socrates	dying.	But,	a	number	of	different	variables	could	represent	the	purported	cause,	and	a	number	of	different	models	could	represent	its	relationship	to	the	effect	of	Socrates’	dying.	Which	of	these	is	accurate	depends	on	what	the	relevant	alternatives	to	drinking	hemlock	are.	How	these	details	get	filled	in	will	determine	whether	or	not	the	variable	that	represents	Socrates	drinking	hemlock	is	proportional.			I	hold	that	the	common	sense	claim	that	drinking	hemlock	causes	Socrates’s	death	implicitly	takes	the	relevant	alternative	to	be	Socrates’s	not	drinking	hemlock.	The	default	context	is	taken	to	be	that	hemlock	was	the	only	possible	poison,	and	drinking	it	the	only	possible	means	of	consumption.	Given	this	context,	the	exhaustive	variable	would	take	the	values	{drinks-hemlock,	doesn’t-																																																								13	I	take	this	to	be	common	knowledge.	See	Franklin-Hall	2016;	McDonnell	2017;	and	Weslake	2017	
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drink-hemlock}.	But,	such	a	variable	is	indeed	proportional	to	the	effect	variable.	Thus,	the	common	sense	cause	is,	in	fact,	proportional.		Such	a	defense	requires	that	common	sense	claims	be	implicitly	relative	to	a	modal	context.	I’m	not	the	first	to	relativize	common	sense	claims	to	context.	Philosophers	such	as	Mackie	and	Schaffer	make	such	a	move,	albeit	with	different	ends	in	mind.14	However,	both	McDonnell	and	Weslake	explicitly	deny	this	kind	of	relativity.15	They	claim	that	the	very	fact	that	we	have	strong	and	convergent	intuitions	about	common	sense	examples,	despite	their	being	under-determined,	demonstrates	that	the	intuitions	are	not	sensitive	to	filling	in	details.		In	response,	I	argue	that	we	respond	to	common	sense	causal	examples	in	the	same	way	that	we	respond	to	standard	conversations.	According	to	Grice,	communication	is	governed	by	a	set	of	conversational	maxims.	16,	17	The	maxims	most	relevant	to	how	an	audience	engages	with	these	under-defined	causal	examples	are	the	maxims	of	quantity	and	relation.	Taken	together,	these	maxims	enjoin	an	interlocutor	to,			 Make	your	contribution	as	informative	as	is	required	(for	the	current	purposes	of	exchange)….[and	no]	more	informative	than	is	required,….[and	b]e	relevant.	(1989,	26	–	27)		Thus,	the	conversationally	natural	way	to	fill	in	the	modal	context	of	these	examples	is	to	take	each	fact	as	informative	and	relevant,	and	to	assume	that	all	informative	facts	have	been	provided.		The	only	information	provided	by	the	hemlock	example	is	the	following:	(i)	Socrates	drinks	hemlock.	(ii)	Socrates	dies.	The	Gricean	maxims	tell	us	that	this	is	all	the	information	needed,	and	that	nothing	significant	has	been	left	out.	So,	the	details	are	filled	in	as	continuous	with	everyday	life.	In	possible	world	speak,																																																									14	See	Mackie	1974,	especially	chapter	2;	and	Schaffer	2005	15	McDonnell	2017;	Weslake	2017	16	See	Grice	1989	17	Bontly	makes	a	similar	point	(see	2005)	
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we’re	looking	only	at	worlds	which	have	a	similar	environment,	a	biologically	similar	Socrates,	etc.,	and	in	which	laws	of	metaphysical	necessity	hold.		The	causal	focus	is	on	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock.	This	means	that	in	evaluating	the	causal	relationship,	everything	else	is	held	fixed	and	the	fact	of	the	drinking	hemlock	is	varied.	Due	to	the	absence	of	any	other	details,	the	only	real	alternative	to	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	his	not	drinking	hemlock.	Nothing	suggests	that	there	are	alternative	means	of	consuming	the	hemlock.	Further,	it’s	not	a	common	occurrence	in	everyday	life	to	have	alternative	means	of	consuming	a	given	poison.	Treating	eating	hemlock	as	a	relevant	alternative	would	be	to	arbitrarily	introduce	something	that	wasn’t	otherwise	specified,	and	whose	presence	can’t	be	justified	by	everyday	experience.			The	objection	from	common	sense	assumes	different	possible	alternatives	than	what	I	take	to	be	implicit,	and	then	tries	to	say	that	relative	to	these	other	alternatives,	the	common	sense	causal	claim	is	not	proportional.	I	have	argued	that	the	common	sense	cause	is	simply	not	relative	to	these	other	alternatives.			However,	even	given	other	possible	alternatives,	the	common	sense	cause	would	still	be	proportional.	The	second	mistake	that	the	objection	makes	is	that	it	fails	to	appreciate	the	constraint	of	exclusivity.			The	objection	holds	that	there	is	some	relevant	alternative	to	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	that	preserves	his	consuming	it.	Take	as	an	arbitrary	alternative	his	eating	hemlock.	Socrates	could	both	drink	and	eat	the	hemlock	–	he	could	wash	down	a	hemlock	salad	with	a	glass	of	hemlock	milk,	for	example.	Following	exclusivity,	then,	these	possibilities	should	be	represented	by	distinct	variables	–	one	that	can	take	the	value	drinks-hemlock,	call	this	D,	and	one	that	can	take	eats-
hemlock,	call	this	E.		
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But,	now	there	is	no	problem.	Following	Woodward’s	response	to	early	pre-emption	cases,18	we	can	hold	E	fixed	at	the	value	that	represents	Socrates	not	eating	the	hemlock,	and	see	if	the	changes	in	D	–	which	we	can	ensure	meets	exhaustivity	by	giving	it	the	second	value	doesn’t-drink-hemlock	–	line	up	with	the	changes	in	the	effect	variable.	They	do.	When	an	intervention	sets	the	value	of	the	cause	variable	to	drinks-hemlock,	the	effect	variable	takes	the	value	dies.	When	an	intervention	sets	the	value	of	the	cause	variable	instead	to	doesn’t-
drink-hemlock,	the	effect	variable	changes	value	to	doesn’t-die.	Once	again,	the	common	sense	cause	is	proportional.		If,	on	the	other	hand,	the	situation	is	such	that	Socrates’s	drinking	hemlock	is	indeed	mutually	exclusive	with	his	eating	hemlock,	then	drinks-hemlock	and	eats-
hemlock	could	be	values	of	the	same	variable.	Imagine	that	Socrates’s	jailor	only	has	enough	money	to	purchase	either	hemlock	leaves	or	hemlock	milk,	but	not	both.	In	this	case,	neither	Socrates’s	drinking	nor	his	eating	will	be	proportional.	The	proportional	cause	is	instead	his	consuming	hemlock.	The	proportional	variable	will	therefore	be	one	that	takes	as	values	{consumes-hemlock,	doesn’t-
consume-hemlock}.			But,	this	is	not	in	conflict	with	common	sense	–	so	long	as	we	abstract	away	from	normal	everyday	circumstances,	and	instead	genuinely	fix	the	situation	as	one	in	which	Socrates	is	forced	to	consume	hemlock,	arbitrarily	receiving	hemlock	leaves	or	milk.	When,	given	this	background,	we’re	asked	what	causes	Socrates’s	death,	it	is	natural	to	say	that	it	was	his	consuming	hemlock.	After	all,	it	isn’t	the	drinking	nor	the	eating	that	makes	a	difference	to	whether	Socrates	dies,	since	had	he	not	done	one	he	would	have	done	the	other.	It	is	his	consuming	hemlock	rather	than	not.		Finally,	I’d	like	to	point	out	that	the	intuition	that	Socrates’s	consuming	hemlock	is	the	more	proportional	cause	is	actually	misguided.	The	naïve	intuition	holds	that	an	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variable	with	the	value	consumes-hemlock	–	call	this	H1	–	is	more	proportional	to	the	exhaustive	and	exclusive	variable	with	the																																																									18	See	Woodward	2003	
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value	drinks-hemlock	–	call	this	H2.	But,	the	modal	context	to	which	H1	will	be	exhaustive	is	different	than	that	to	which	H2	will	be.	They’re	therefore	not	even	in	competition	for	proportionality.	Instead,	I	suggest	that	this	intuition	is	a	response	to	the	fact	that	H1’s	modal	context	is	more	inclusive	than	that	of	H2.	H1	can	accurately	(and	proportionally)	represent	the	cause	of	Socrates’s	death	in	a	wider	range	of	situations	than	can	H2.	But,	this	is	about	stability	–	as	earlier	defined	–	not	about	proportionality.	The	model	that	employs	H1	is	simply	more	
stable	than	that	which	employs	H2.	This	putative	proportionality	intuition	is	actually	responding	to	the	property	of	stability.		
7.	Conclusion	
	In	this	paper,	I	have	defended	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality	by	explicating	the	exhaustivity	and	exclusivity	constraints,	and	stipulating	that	proportionality	requires	variables	that	meet	these	constraints.			These	constraints	have	been	defined	on	the	assumption	that	a	variable	represents	a	particular	object’s	instantiations	of	a	particular	type	of	property.	But,	they	are	easily	generalized	to	cover	alternate	objects	of	representation.	Take	events,	for	example.	If	variables	represent	particular	kinds	of	events	occurring	or	failing	to	occur,	then	exhaustivity	would	require	that	the	values	of	a	variable	cover	the	entire	range	of	possibilities	of	event	occurrence	for	whatever	type	of	event	the	variable	represents.	Exclusivity	would	require	that	the	values	of	a	variable	be	event	occurrences	such	that	no	two	could	occur	simultaneously.		Finally,	I	have	articulated	how	the	interventionist	formulation	of	proportionality	responds	to	the	objection	from	common	sense.	Such	an	objection	dissolves	once	the	explicated	constraints	on	variable	selection	are	honored.	
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